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We investigate the extent to which dichotomous choice referenda responses are shaped
by whether the individual believes the survey itself will ultimately impact policy. Using
survey data from the Iowa Lakes Project, we test this supposition. Speciﬁcally, we
employ a Bayesian treatment effect model in which the degree of perceived
consequentiality, measured as an ordinal response, is permitted to have a structural
impact on willingness to pay (WTP) for a hypothetical environmental improvement. We
test whether the estimated WTP distributions are the same for each value of the ordinal
response.
In our survey data, a subsample of individuals were randomly assigned supporting
information suggesting that their responses to the questionnaires were important and
will have an impact on policy decisions. In conjunction with a Bayesian posterior
simulator, we use this source of exogenous variation to identify the structural impacts of
consequentiality perceptions on willingness to pay, while controlling for the potential of
confounding on unobservables. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with a ‘‘knife-edge’’ result,
namely that the willingness to pay distributions are equal among those believing the
survey to be at least minimally consequential, and different for those believing that the
survey is irrelevant for policy purposes.
& 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Despite lingering concerns within the economics literature, stated preferences methods for valuing non-market
commodities are frequently used both by policymakers and in the judicial system to assess changes to environmental
goods and services. Best practices, starting with the NOAA panel recommendations, have evolved over time aimed at
minimizing potential biases in survey responses. These guidelines emphasize the careful design and pre-testing of the
survey instrument so as ‘‘...to induce respondents to take the [survey] question[s] seriously’’ [1, p. 4606]. In this context, it
is surprising that relatively little attention has been given to assessing whether respondents actually believe that the
survey itself will potentially inﬂuence future policy. If they do not believe this to be the case, they have little incentive to
respond truthfully and their answers may be largely noise. Indeed, Carson and Groves (CG) [2] argue that individuals can be
expected to answer the standard dichotomous choice referendum question truthfully if two conditions hold. First, the
respondent must believe that the results of the survey might inﬂuence an outcome they care about, a condition we refer to
as policy consequentiality. Second, the respondent must perceive that there is some probability that they will have to pay, or
payment consequentiality. Jointly, these two conditions (strong consequentiality) yield a knife-edge implication; i.e., as long
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as the respondent believes that their answers will be consequential in both senses with any positive probability, their
dominant strategy is to answer truthfully. If accurate, this result has clear and important implications regarding how a
researcher should handle survey responses: all data arising from respondents who believe the survey is at least minimally
consequential can be assumed to provide truthful answers to survey questions.
1
In this paper, we focus our attention on the role that policy consequentiality has on the responses to a dichotomous
choice referendum question and the efﬁcacy of an information treatment designed to increase the perceived degree of
consequentiality.
2;3 Speciﬁcally, we use respondents’ perceptions of consequentiality elicited in the 2005 Iowa Lakes
Survey to determine whether individuals have different perceptions concerning the degree of consequentiality of the
valuation exercise and whether these perceptions affects respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP).
4 In the survey,
respondents were asked whether they would vote in favor of a referendum to improve water quality at a lake where bid
values were varied across the sample. Respondents were also asked to answer, on a scale from 1 to 5, how likely it was that
the survey results would inﬂuence decisions in the state concerning water quality programs. Thus, a measure of the degree
to which respondents perceived the survey as policy consequential was directly elicited. Based on the CG arguments,
respondents who do not believe that the survey is consequential could be omitted from the sample for estimation
purposes. Additionally, the distributions of WTP from respondents with differing views concerning the degree of
consequentiality could be tested for equality.
To extract accurate estimates of the impact of consequentiality perceptions on WTP, it is important to recognize that
respondents who indicate a high degree of consequentiality may do so because they also place a high value in the proposed
water quality improvement project. In other words, there is a potential endogeneity, or unobserved confounding problem.
To address this concern, a split sample treatment was administered in the survey. Speciﬁcally, half of the sample was
provided with a highlighted article from the Iowa Conservationist—the magazine of the Iowa Department of Natural
Resources (IDNR), the state agency with primary responsibility for water quality control—indicating that IDNR was already
using results from the survey in their policy decisions and planned to continue to do so. Our assumption, which is borne
out empirically, is that the presentation of this information will positively affect the respondents’ perceived degree of
consequentiality. This exogenous treatment aids us in estimating the ‘‘causal’’ impacts of consequentiality perceptions on
WTP, as we will describe below.
Making use of the information treatment in the survey, we can then explore the impact that perceived policy
consequentiality has on willingness to pay within the framework of a standard triangular treatment-response model. We
proceed using a Bayesian approach and derive and employ a new algorithm that improves upon standard estimation
methods, and can be applied by other practitioners seeking to ﬁt models with a similar structure. Speciﬁcally, since our
consequentiality responses are ordinal, our model must contend with the estimation of cutpoint values, and it is well-
documented in the literature that standard Gibbs sampling schemes in such models can suffer from very poor mixing,
particularly in moderately large data sets, thus producing imprecise and potentially inaccurate posterior inference (e.g.,
[3,4]).
5 Our proposed posterior simulator offers signiﬁcant improvements by sampling the cutpoints, latent willingness to
pay and latent consequentiality variables in a single step rather than sampling each component from its corresponding
complete posterior conditional distribution.
Finally, before proceeding, it is important to clarify what implications can be drawn from the analysis below. Our survey
gathers information as to whether respondents believe the results of the survey ‘‘... will affect decisions about water
quality in Iowa Lakes.’’ This is, at a minimum, a measure of the perceived policy conquentiality of the survey. As such, our
econometric analysis identiﬁes the extent to which responses to a dichotomous choice CV question differ as these
perceptions differ. Drawing additional implications become difﬁcult. If respondents also assume that the statement carries
with it an implied obligation to pay, then we have a measure of strong consequentiality and Carson and Grove’s theoretical
results would suggest that all respondents with a perceived consequentiality of 2 or greater would respond truthfully. This
is consistent with our ﬁndings below that WTP is only different for those individuals who perceive the survey to be
completely inconsequential. However, as the survey does not directly ask individuals whether they perceive the survey
carries with it a potential obligation to pay, the results are open to interpretation. As one reviewer suggests, if no one
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1 It is worth noting that the CG ‘‘theory’’ is itself not without controversy. As one reviewer noted, some see a weakness of the CG work in that it fails to
predict the direction of bias in an ‘‘inconsequential’’ survey. In practice, hypothetical surveys often generate WTP values that exceed those generated in a
real market, suggesting that the hypothetical bias is positive. Since the CG story does not provide a basis for this prediction, it might be argued that the
theory is incomplete. While these are important issues, we make no attempt to address them here, rather leaving them for others to ponder.
2 Throughout the remainder of this paper, we use the term ‘‘consequentiality’’ to refer to the notion of ‘‘policy consequentiality,’’ as deﬁned above.
When it is necessary to distinguish policy consequentiality from either payment or strong consequentiality, we use the additional qualiﬁer.
3 Interestingly, Landry and List [10] suggest that surveys could elicit the perceived degree of consequentiality directly from respondents which is
precisely the approach we adopted when designing this instrument several years ago.
4 In practice we must make some assumptions regarding the reliability of our data. Speciﬁcally, we do not investigate potential issues of misreporting
in the consequentiality reports, but treat these ordinal responses as accurate representations of agents’ beliefs. One may argue that the CG model is unable
to characterize the validity of WTP responses for those in the inconsequential group, and thus the validity of responses to the consequentiality question
itself may also be uncertain. We do not take up this issue in the current paper, but instead, proceed conditionally on the observed consequentiality
responses.
5 ‘‘Poor mixing’’ in simulation based approaches, such as Gibbs sampling, refers to the problem of the algorithmyielding high serial correlation among
the draws from the distribution of interest. This high correlation, in turn, implies that a large number of simulation draws are required to accurately
estimate characteristics of the distribution, such as its mean, mode or variance.
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believes that they will have to pay, then those perceiving the survey to be consequential have an incentive to respond
strategically, indicating a higher willingness to pay assuming that they will never have to pay. We leave it to the reader to
draw their own conclusions.
2. Related literature
There have been several studies to date testing the impact of ‘‘consequentiality’’ on respondents’ preference revelation.
These have largely been carried out through laboratory or ﬁeld experiments (as discussed below, Bulte et al. [5] provide an
exception investigating consequentiality within a stated preference framework).
6 In these laboratory settings,
‘‘consequentiality’’ typically takes the form of ‘‘strong consequentiality.’’ The outcome of the experiment (i.e., both the
provision of and payment for the good begin considered) is binding with a probability set by the researcher. Cummings
et al. [7], for example, conducted an experiment involving real and purely hypothetical referenda to compare how
respondents behave in these two settings. They ﬁnd that respondents are more likely to vote ‘‘yes’’ in the hypothetical
setting than in the real setting and conclude that hypothetical referenda yield biased estimates of WTP. Cummings and
Taylor [8] explore this issue further by investigating how the hypothetical bias of the dichotomous choice referendum
varies with the degree of consequentiality. Speciﬁcally, their laboratory experiment employs a probabilistic treatment that
varies the odds that the referendum will be binding. They ﬁnd that participants in different treatments, including
hypothetical, probabilistic, and real referendum, behave signiﬁcantly different from one another. Speciﬁcally, the
probability of a respondent voting ‘‘yes’’ falls if the probability of the referendum being binding rises. They also ﬁnd that
respondents’ voting behavior is signiﬁcantly different from an actual referendum unless there is high probability that
the referendum will be binding (e.g., greater than 50 percent). The latter ﬁnding is not consistent with the knife-edge result
of CG.
A second study within a laboratory setting is reported by Shogren and Tadevosyan [9]. They report that in an induced-
value second price auction, participants faced with a consequential treatment (a positive probability of the auction being
binding) report an average willingness to pay (and standard deviation) of 4.35 (6.60) compared to 4.16 (2.91) for their real
treatment. Despite the apparent overlap of these distributions based on the reported standard deviations, their regression
analysis rejects equivalence of the means and they conclude that ‘‘...bidding behavior in the consequential auction was
neither optimal nor identical to real auction bidding.’’
Carson et al. [11] conduct a study within the context of a ﬁeld experiment. In the experiment, participants were
informed the probability of the dichotomous choice referendum being binding. In contrast to Cummings and Taylor [8],
they ﬁnd the ‘‘knife-edge’’ theoretical results suggested in CG [2]: as long as the probability of consequentiality exceeds
zero even by a small amount, participants respond in the same manner as in an actual referendum. They suggest that
results from inconsequential (hypothetical) referendum should not be used to make inference about how CV works in
consequential referendum.
Landry and List (2007) also undertake a ﬁeld experiment, in this case with four treatments: Hypothetical, Cheap Talk,
Consequential, and Real. While they ﬁnd that WTP elicited within the purely hypothetical treatment differs statistically
from those in the real treatment, both the Consequential and Cheap Talk designs yield responses that are consistent with
real responses. While their ﬁndings are consistent with the CG arguments, since they used a single degree of
consequentiality in their design (a 50 percent chance that the referendum would be binding) their results do not provide
insight on whether lower degrees of consequentiality would generate the same ﬁndings.
Though quite useful, these studies largely take place outside of the context of an actual CV exercise and require the
analyst to inform participants of the degree of consequentiality associated with the exercise. These laboratory and ﬁeld
experiments have the important advantage that the researcher can directly control the degree of consequentiality, but their
disadvantage is that this direct control is not typical of CV surveys. Thus, ﬁndings from the lab or ﬁeld may be difﬁcult to
transfer to the survey arena. Within a survey setting, there is only one study we are aware of that directly investigates the
consequentiality issue. Bulte et al. [5] explore the impact of ‘‘policy consequentiality’’ by telling respondents that the
results of the survey will be made available to policy makers, though they do not directly elicit respondents’ reactions to
this information. Their WTP estimates obtained from the survey with ‘‘cheap talk’’ and the survey with a consequentiality
device are signiﬁcantly smaller than those obtained in a purely hypothetical survey. In addition, the WTP estimates
obtained from the survey with cheap talk are not signiﬁcantly different from the WTP’s obtained from the survey with a
consequential device. Their results are also consistent with the CG predictions.
In Bulte et al. [5], survey respondents were directly informed that the ﬁndings from the survey will be made available to
policy makers. In our study, we take this approach a signiﬁcant step further: we show survey respondents direct
statements from a policy maker indicating that the ﬁndings from the survey instrument will be used to direct decisions.
Moreover, we seek to determine whether (and to what extent) the survey participants are swayed by our arguments.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
6 Field experiments are distinct from laboratory experiments in that they involve engaging subjects in real world settings, such as sports card trade
shows, rather than in the laboratory. Harrison and List [6] provide an overview of ﬁeld experiments.
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3. The empirical model
To test for the potential existence of differential impacts of perceived consequentiality on willingness to pay, we
consider the following two equation system
7:
c 
i ¼ xcibc þec; ð1Þ
w 

















Eq. (1) corresponds to the latent ‘‘consequentiality’’ equation, while Eq. (2) corresponds to the latent ‘‘willingness to pay’’
equation. The latent c 
i and w 
i are not observed, but their values generate an observed binary willingness to pay indicator
wi and reported consequentiality variable ci. In our data, ci takes on ﬁve different ordered values, ranging from regarding
the survey as being completely irrelevant to the making of policy (ci ¼ 1) to regarding the survey as having a deﬁnite
impact on policy (ci ¼ 5). We thus relate the observables w and c to their latent values as follows:
wi ¼
1i f w 
i ZBi;
0i f w 
i oBi; ci ¼
1i f  1 oc 
i r0;
2i f 0 oc 
i ra3;
3i f a3oc 
i ra4;
4i f a4oc 
i ra5;
5i f a5oc 
i o1;
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
where Bi is a hypothetical price (bid) proposed to individual i and ci in (2) is a 1   5 vector with a one in the cith column
and zeros elsewhere. (Note, with this formulation of the model, an intercept must be excluded from xwiÞ: The parameter
vector dc (within the treatment-response framework of (1) and (2) and with a valid exclusion restriction or instrument in
xc) is commonly interpreted as capturing the ‘‘causal’’ impact of consequentiality categories on WTP. We similarly denote
dcj as the jth element of dc, the parameter associated with the event that ci ¼ j.
It is also worth noting that, although the observed wi responses are binary, and (2) represents a latent variable equation
that generates this binary response, we do not restrict the variance of (2) to unity. Variation in the bids Bi across individuals
enables identiﬁcation of s2
w and thereby enables us to estimate the entire WTP distribution. The consequentiality equation
in (1), however, is a ‘‘standard’’ ordered choice equation, whence we restrict the variance of (1) to unity for identiﬁcation
purposes.
In practice, a variety of methods can be employed to ﬁt this model. We have experimented with some traditional
alternatives, such as simulated maximum likelihood, and found it difﬁcult to get successful convergence and good
performance, even under ideal conditions with correct model speciﬁcation. To this end, we choose to employ a Bayesian
estimation approach with data augmentation (e.g., [12,13, Chapter 14]), which is quite similar in spirit to classical
likelihood-based techniques, and is indistinguishable from these alternatives in large sample sizes when suitably ‘‘diffuse’’
or ‘‘non-informative’’ priors are employed.
Simply adopting the Bayesian methodology, however, is not a guarantee of good performance, and indeed, some
important complications arise concerning how best to estimate the parameters of our equation system under this
approach. With typical conjugate priors,
8 for example, ﬁtting the model in (1) and (2) using Gibbs sampling (i.e., an
algorithm that iteratively samples from the complete posterior conditionals for each set of parameters) is reasonably
straightforward, following the important work of Albert and Chib [14]. However, unless care is taken in the development
and application of these samplers, slow mixing and unreliable inference can occur. Thus, unless something is done to
improve the ‘‘baseline’’ Gibbs algorithm that samples from each parameter’s conditional posterior distribution, use of
Bayesian techniques offers little or no improvement over these other alternatives. To this end, we offer a reﬁnement of such
‘‘off-the-shelf’’ simulation methods which offers substantial performance improvements.
First, we introduce a reparameterization, following the suggestion of Nandram and Chen [4] in the context of a single-
equation ordered probit model. Speciﬁcally, we let g ¼ a 1
5 and deﬁne x
 
  gx: [That is, the  
  notation simply denotes the
operation of taking the original variable and multiplying it by g.] Multiplying (1) by g and adjusting the rule mapping the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
7 As pointed out by a referee, it is also possible that w  in (2) should appear as right-hand side variable in the structural representation of c  in (1). In
this case, the parameters in (1) are interpreted as reduced-form and no type of structural impact should be ascribed to these effects. For purposes of the
present study, the key parameters are those appearing in Eq. (2) and those in (1) are, with the notable exception of the instrument’s coefﬁcient, not of
primary interest. Of course, the parameters of (2) are both identiﬁable and consistently estimable provided an instrument is available in (1). Finally, we
adopt the convention throughout this paper of using boldface to denote vector or matrix quantities and capital letters to denote matrices.
8 A (conditionally) conjugate prior is a prior that yields a (conditional) posterior distribution of the same functional form.
J. Herriges et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 59 (2010) 67–81 70
 4 / 16 





























1i f w 
i ZBi
0i f w 
i oBi
and ci ¼
1i f  1 oc
  
i r0;





















> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
8
> > > > > > > > > <
































0  0 and R
 
 1
rather than the original parameterization of the model. The primary reasons for doing this are threefold. First, the
reparameterization helps to improve the mixing of the posterior simulations (e.g., [4]), as freeing up the variance parameter
rather restricting it to unity tends to reduce the lagged autocorrelations among the parameter draws. Second, the
reparameterization eliminates one component of the cutpoint vector (which is important in our case since a
 
is two-
dimensional, and routines for calculating bivariate, but not trivariate, normal probabilities are readily available).
10 Finally,
the reparameterization eliminates the diagonal restriction on the 2   2 covariance matrix, enabling the use of a Wishart
prior on R
 
 1 and a standard Gibbs step for sampling its elements.
11
Since the structural parameters bc, scw; s2
w and a ¼½ a3 a4 a5 0 (rather than their transformations) are ultimately of
interest, we can, of course, recover these by using the appropriate inverse transformations at each iteration of the sampler:
bc ¼ b
 
c=g; seu ¼ s
 




4=gÞ g 1 0:
3.1. Priors and the joint posterior
As fully described in Appendix A, we ﬁt this model using Gibbs sampling coupled with the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm and auxiliary variable Gibbs (e.g., [17]). Before talking about the speciﬁcs of this algorithm, we must ﬁrst derive
our augmented posterior distribution. This augmented posterior involves adding the latent c
  
and w  to the joint posterior






















































where the product term follows from the assumed (conditional) independence across observations. For the ﬁrst term on

































9 We do not, however, take up the issue of the induced priors on the original structural parameters.
10 Appendix A provides details regarding the speciﬁcs of the required calculations for sampling the transformed cutpoints. All of the appendices for
this paper are available at JEEM’s online archive of supplementary material and can be accessed at http://www.aere.org/journals/.
11 This latter point should probably be regarded as a minor contribution in light of the fact that one can simply write, for example, ewi ¼ scweci þ ui,
with ui independent of eci, substitute this into Eq. (2), and then develop a posterior simulator. See, e.g., [15,16] for examples of this strategy.
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with Ið Þ denoting the standard indicator function, and
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For the last of these three priors, we impose the ordering restriction on the cutpoints. Unconditionally, we specify a prior
for the smallest transformed cutpoint, a
 
3 which is uniform over its support, while a
 




A second contribution of our algorithm is that we utilize a blocking step to sample a group of parameters jointly, rather
than conditionally, thus signiﬁcantly improving the mixing of our posterior simulations. That is, our algorithm employs a
blocking procedure wherein the 2   1 vector of transformed cutpoints, a
 
and latent data c
  
, w  are sampled together in a
single step rather than sampled from their respective conditional posterior distributions. The clear need for such an
algorithm was motivated by generated data experiments suggesting poor mixing of the simulated cutpoints when
separately sampling from each parameter’s conditional posterior distribution.
12 In cases where objects of interest are
functions of the cutpoints, such as the WTP distribution described below, the improved mixing offered by our algorithm
would seem to offer a substantial beneﬁt.
3.2. The WTP predictive
As we noted in the Introduction, a primary focus of our paper involves the calculation and comparison of WTP
distributions for individuals with varying degrees of perceived consequentiality. To this end, we consider a posterior
predictive exercise and seek to obtain the WTP distribution for a hypothetical out-of-sample agent with observed
characteristics xcf and xwf and consequentiality response cf ¼ j. The model in (3) and (4), assumed to hold for this agent’s
outcomes, implies that the posterior predictive willingness to pay distribution for this representative agent, conditioned on
the model parameters C, is given as
pðw 


























Factoring the latter distribution into the conditional c
  
f jw 
f and the marginal for w 




f jcf ¼ j;CÞ¼ F
a
 



























































 ! : ð11Þ
In practice, we would like to calculate a variety of statistics associated with this willingness to pay distribution. For
example, quantities like the posterior mean, posterior standard deviation, and posterior median (which is critical for
ARTICLE IN PRESS
12 Again, we refer here to the case where no blocking steps are employed, and the cutpoints are drawn element-by-element from their (uniform)
posterior conditional distributions.
13 Note that this speciﬁcation reduces to the marginal for w 
f when rcw (and thus s
 
cw) equals zero.
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determining whether or not a particular referendum is likely to pass under majority vote) are certainly of interest and are
policy relevant.
Since these quantities are not easily calculated analytically, given the rather messy form of (11), it seems desirable to
pursue a numerical alternative by obtaining draws from (11) and using these draws to calculate any statistic of interest.
Unfortunately, (11) is not of an immediately recognizable functional form, thus calling into question the feasibility of this




f  TNðzf; zfÞð0;1Þ


















f ¼ p0f þp1z 
f þp2e;
where
e Nð0;1Þ; p0f ¼ xwfbc þ dcj; p1 ¼ swr
 






as a draw from (11).
14 The above procedure provides a simple to implement series of steps (i.e., they only require drawing
from standard distributions) for sampling from the WTP distribution directly, whence any feature of this distribution can
be calculated. In practice, the steps above are repeated for each post-convergence simulation C, and the collection of the
resulting draws are then used to calculate the desired quantity or quantities. To our knowledge, a description of such a
method in the presence of an endogeneity problem offers a new and hopefully valuable contribution to the literature.
Beyond these speciﬁc statistics, it is also of interest to provide a plot of the full posterior predictive distribution. While
(11) is conditioned on the parameters C, the Bayesian approach handles parameter uncertainty by integrating the
parameters out of the conditional posterior predictive. In the context of our problem, we would like to obtain
pðw 
f jcf ¼ j;c;wÞ¼
Z
pðw 
f jcf ¼ j;CÞpðCjc;wÞdC; ð12Þ
since w 
f , in the case of random sampling, is independent of the past data c;w given C. Simply plotting the left-hand side of
(12) can be done without having to take draws from the (conditional) posterior predictive, as described above. Instead, we
can provide a ‘‘Rao–Blackwell’’ approximation of this posterior predictive by noting
pðw 






f jcf ¼ j;C ¼ C
ðrÞÞ;
where C
ðrÞ is the rth post-convergence simulation from the posterior distribution, R denotes the total number of
simulations, and pðw 
f jcf ¼ j;C ¼ C
ðrÞÞ is known from (11). In our empirical results provided in Section 4, we use this method
to plot various posterior predictives and also sample directly from (11) to calculate speciﬁc features of this distribution
whose values are not known analytically.
4. The data and study limitations
This study employs data from the 2005 survey of the ‘‘Iowa Lakes Project,’’ a four-year study and panel data collection
effort aimed at understanding recreational use and the value of water quality in the primary recreational lakes of Iowa. The
project began in 2002 with mail surveys sent to a random sample of 8,000 Iowa residents, obtaining detailed information
regarding their visitation patterns to approximately 130 lakes, as well as standard socio-demographic data (e.g., age,
education, income and gender). In subsequent years, surveys were sent to those households completing a survey in the
prior year.
15 Standard follow-up procedures were followed in each year of the survey, including a postcard reminder mailed
two weeks after the initial mailing and a second copy of the survey mailed one month later. Households were provided a
$10 incentive for completing the survey each year, helping to provide for response rates ranging from 62–72 percent across
the four years of the project.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
14 It is also worth noting that (11) is closely related to the skew normal random variable, and our procedure for sampling from it can be regarded as a
slight generalization of the additive construction representation of this random (e.g., [18,19]).
15 A second random sample was added in the panel in 2003 to ﬁll in for non-deliverable surveys in 2003 and return the sample to a total of 8,000
households. No additional households were added after 2003.
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The contingent valuation (and consequentiality) responses modeled in the current paper were included only in the 2003
and 2005 versions of the questionnaire. In 2003, a referendum style CV question was posed to estimate WTP for a water
quality improvement project at one of eight focus lakes targeted in the study. These lakes were selected in consultationwith
the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. In addition to being geographically dispersed, the target lakes are each of policy
interest since various restoration projects are being considered for them. Each respondent was asked a CV question for only
one of the focus lakes. The survey described the current water quality information of the lake, including water clarity, water
color, water odor, health concerns from algae blooms and bacteria level, and variety and quantity of ﬁsh. A photograph,
illustrating the water clarity and water color, was provided to help respondents picture the current water quality of the focus
lake vividly. Prior to the main valuation question, cheap talk text was used to remind respondents about the incentive and
information properties of stated preference question in a further attempt to elicit truthful responses to the CV questions.
16
A water quality improvement project regarding the focus lake was then proposed that outlined the methods to achieve
the water quality improvement at each lake, such as dredging and building protection strips around the perimeter.
Respondents were asked whether they would vote in favor of the referendum to improve the lake where bid values
(ranging from $100 to $600 payable over a ﬁve year period) were randomly assigned to households in the sample receiving
the survey. Finally, the perceived consequentiality of the survey was elicited from respondents by asking the following
question: ‘‘How likely do you think it is that the results of surveys such as this one will affect decisions about water quality
in Iowa lakes?’’ Possible responses to this question ranged from 1 to 5 where a 1 denoted ‘‘no effect at all’’ (i.e., completely
inconsequential) and 5 denoted ‘‘deﬁnite’’ effects.
The 2003 survey responses indicated that the more consequential the respondents viewed the survey, the higher the
observed ‘‘yes’’ rate to the proposed referendum.
17 The ‘‘yes’’ rate was lowest (13 percent) among respondents who believe
the survey is inconsequential, and ranged from 27 percent to 38 percent when respondents believe the survey has some
degree of consequentiality. In addition, the voting pattern of respondents who reported any degree of consequentiality (i.e.,
anyone who reported a 2, 3, 4, or 5 to the consequentiality question) was consistent with economic theory: the ‘‘yes’’ rate
fell as the bid value rose.
18 In this sample, it was also the case that the ‘‘yes’’ rate of the inconsequential group was clearly
lower than that of consequential group at each bid value.
The results of the 2003 survey were promising in terms of indicating the relationship between the responses of survey
participants to the dichotomous choice CV referendum and the individual’s perceptions regarding the survey’s policy
consequentiality. To measure the extent of this relationship, we could estimate a simple, single-equation WTP function for
each level of reported consequentiality and test whether the distributions are statistically different from one another.
However, as noted in the Introduction, there is the potential endogeneity of respondents’ responses to the consequentiality
question. In particular, respondents who have a high WTP may believe the survey is consequential due to the importance of
the project. Likewise, respondents who indicated a low degree of consequentiality may do so because they place a low
value in the proposed water quality improvement project.
To control for this potential endogeneity, a split sample treatment was added to the 2005 Iowa Lakes survey. To do so,
we took advantage of a unique opportunity in the form of a magazine article and letter from the director of the state’s
Department of Natural Resources that had recently been published in the Iowa Conservationist, the magazine of the DNR. In
the introductory letter, the DNR director (Jeff Vonk) stated that ‘‘... information from these two studies is going to be
critical in prioritizing lake restoration projects not only from an environmental perspective, but from a return on
investment standpoint.’’ The presence of this article provided us with a unique opportunity to provide compelling evidence
of the consequentially of a survey directly to survey participants. Rather than simply telling respondents that the survey
results would be made available to policy makers, we were able to provide direct evidence from a widely circulated source
indicating that the answers to the survey would directly affect policy decisions. Speciﬁcally, half of the sample was
provided with a copy of the director’s letter and the associated article indicating that the IDNR was already using results
from previous surveys in their policy decisions and planned to continue to do so.
It is possible, however, that the presentation of this supporting material will have affected the perception of the public
good, thereby reducing the value of the split sample treatment as an instrument.
19 If this material is presented in such a
way, however, that does not emphasize the importance of the project itself, but rather, only emphasizes the importance of
the survey responses in decision making, then the instrument would remain legitimate.
To focus participants attention on the consequentiality aspect of the letter, in the materials provided to the treated
survey respondents, a particular passage was highlighted and its message summarized (by us) in bold red print in the
margin of the document. It is our view that the information treatment will have its primary affect on individuals through
this highlighted passage, as it should be the ﬁrst (and potentially only) passage that the respondent will read. That speciﬁc
passage states: ‘‘Director Vonk agrees that your input is important in prioritizing restoration projects.’’
20 This statement
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16 The speciﬁc wording used in the cheap talk is provided in Appendix C, which is available at JEEM’s online archive of supplementary material.
17 Summary statistics for the 2003 survey are provided in Appendix table B1, which is available at JEEM’s online archive of supplementary material.
18 See Appendix B, Figure 1.
19 Ideally, the published letter from the DNR director would have said nothing about the water quality of the lakes other than explaining the
importance of the survey results to decisions; however, this could hardly be expected.
20 The full text of the letter from the Director as sent to survey respondents and the accompanying cover letter is contained in Appendix C, available at
JEEM’s online archive.
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appeals directly to the individual’s perceptions regarding the consequentiality of the survey responses, but makes no
reference to the underlying importance of the projects themselves. In addition, this point was reiterated in the cover letter
sent to respondents. Thus, we feel that the instrument used is indeed valid in practice.
There are two other aspects of the 2005 survey worthy of note. First, the percentage ‘‘yes’’ response rates from the 2003
survey never exceeded ﬁfty percent. Typically, one wants the ‘‘yes’’ responses rates to range from 25 percent to 75 percent
over the various bid values used, reducing the need for the model (rather than the data) to characterize the shape of the
willingness-to-pay distribution. To alleviate this problem, the bid values in 2005 were once again randomly assigned, but
this time they were allowed to range from $10 to $600. The percentage ‘‘yes’’ response rates in 2005 ranges from less than
15 percent to nearly 80 percent. Second, due to other project needs, only a subset of 2005 survey participants were used as
part of the split treatment consequentiality investigation. Speciﬁcally, just under 2000 of the households were randomly
divided between the treatment and control groups used to estimate the model developed in Section 3 above.
21
Table 1 provides a summary of the data obtained in 2005. The ‘‘yes’’ response rates from the 2005 survey (as depicted in
Fig.1) are similar to those observed in 2003 survey. Speciﬁcally, though the sample sizes in each cell are smaller than in the
2003 survey (See Appendix B, Figure 1), there is a clear trend of decreasing ‘‘yes’’ rates as the bid value rises for the groups
of respondents who indicated some degree of consequentiality (i.e., with responses of 2, 3, 4, or 5). But this pattern is not
observed for those in the inconsequential group. Moreover, as observed in the 2003 survey, the ‘‘yes’’ rate amongst the
inconsequential group is lower than that of consequential group even in lower bid values.
5. Empirical results
Using the model described Section 3 and the algorithm fully documented in the Appendix, we ﬁt our two equation
triangular treatment-response model. We run our posterior simulator for 50,000 simulations and discard the ﬁrst 5,000
simulations as the burn-in. Numerous generated data experiments, which are not reported here for the sake of brevity,
revealed that our algorithm mixed reasonably well (i.e., the lagged autocorrelations among our parameter simulations were
not severe, and for some parameters, resembled what would be obtained under iid sampling), and consistently recovered
parameters of the data generating process in a variety of experimental designs (i.e., those with high and low degrees of
endogeneity and those with balanced and non-balanced frequencies for the observed consequentiality responses). For our
priors, we set lb ¼ 0, Vb ¼ð 200
2ÞIk, n ¼ 5 and R ¼ I2, which are reasonably non-informative choices, suggesting that
information coming from the data will dominate information added through our prior.
5.1. Diagnostic checking
Before diving into our empirical results, we ﬁrst provide some information regarding the overall performance of our
model. Our assumptions, signiﬁcantly stronger than those required for popular alternatives like standard IV, involve a
complete description of the joint distribution of observables pðc;wjCÞ. To this end, it is important to assess the
appropriateness of these assumptions and to document potential deﬁciencies associated with the model speciﬁcation.
There are numerous diagnostic checks for investigating the reasonableness of a model’s assumptions in the Bayesian
paradigm, including, for example, the use of QQ plots (e.g., [20, Chapter 2]), posterior predictive p-values (e.g., [21, Section
6.3]), and other comparisons of speciﬁc features of the model to their counterparts in the observed data (e.g., [13, Chapter
11]). We focus here on one such exercise, which involves simulation from the posterior predictive distribution.
The idea behind this exercise is to try and replicate the distribution of the observed data, or speciﬁc features of the data
that are important to the problem at hand, based on output from the model itself. If the model is legitimate for the analysis
of a given data set, then it is reasonable to require that the model will produce a distribution of predicted outcomes that
mimics what is found in the raw data. For example, if a simple wage regression were run under the assumption that wages
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Table 1
2005 summary statistics by level of consequentiality.
Variable c ¼ 1 c ¼ 2 c ¼ 3 c ¼ 4 c ¼ 5
Num. observations ðnÞ 83 266 782 689 176
Percentage YES 0.23 0.42 0.47 0.53 0.48
Percent not visited 0.50 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.26
Percent male 0.53 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.61
College 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.37
Income/$1,000 58.05 56.71 54.72 53.73 57.71
Std. income (16.60) (15.62) (15.31) (14.35) (14.98)
Age 54.00 63.43 63.75 64.95 59.30
Std. age (38.64) (37.28) (38.12) (37.38) (41.07)
21 Appendix Table B2 provides a breakdown of the consequentiality responses for the treatment and control groups.
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were normally distributed, the posterior predictive density of wages would be symmetric, while the observed density of
hourly wages would have a pronounced right-skew. This exercise would therefore reveal that an assumption of the
model—namely that of normality—is inappropriate for the observed data.













j  yrepjC ¼ Cj;y; with Cj representing the jth post-convergence draw from our posterior simulator. The density
pðyrepjC;yÞ is simply the likelihood function assumed by the given model (which does not depend on y given C). In these
simulations, we obtain a vector y
rep
j from the conditional density pðyrepjC ¼ Cj;yÞ by choosing exactly the same xc and xw
values as those that our found in our sample of data. This motivates our use of the notation ‘‘rep’’ to denote replications of
the observed data from the posterior predictive, i.e., they are ‘‘a re-run of history on the assumption that the model is what
generates histories’’ [20, pp. 90–91].
The act of generating a series of yrep variates in this way can be used to reveal how well the model fares in reproducing
the actual outcome distributions in our sample. Thus, for each post-convergence simulation Cj; we draw the latent vector
c
  ;rep
using the xc values in the sample, calculate the discrete indicator crep from this latent data, and then generate a latent
willingness to pay w ;rep from the conditional distribution pðw ;repjc
  ;rep
;Cj;xw;rep ¼ xwÞ. From this ﬁnal draw, we calculate
the replicated willingness to pay as wrep ¼ maxf0;w ;repg: We then compare features of these replicated simulations to
those same features from the observed data.
As we should expect, the posterior predictive frequencies associated with the consequentiality responses closely match
those found in the raw data. Speciﬁcally, the posterior means associated with the fraction of observations for crep 2
f1;2;3;4;5g were 4.4, 13.2, 38.9, 34.5 and 8.9, while those found in the raw data were 4.2, 13.3, 39.2, 34.5 and 8.8,
respectively. At the individual level, however, the results are less encouraging. The posterior mean (and posterior standard
deviation) of the fraction of crep values that correctly predict their counterpart in the observed data is 0.31 (0.011). This, of
course, is an improvement over randomly guessing based on a uniform prior (which would achieve a success rate of 20
percent), but does suggest that our covariates will not play a strong role in describing variation in consequentiality
perceptions. In particular, and as will be discussed in the following subsection, the instrument will only play a small role in
tracing out variation in consequentiality responses. This will lead to reduced posterior precision associated with the
‘‘causal’’ effect parameters dc in (4), which will make it more difﬁcult to get conclusive information regarding tests of
parameter equality. It is important to note, however, that these results do not necessarily signal a deﬁciency of the model’s
assumptions, but simply document that it is difﬁcult to determine why some individuals believe the surveys are useful for
policy purposes, while others believe they have little or no value for policymaking.
To assess the adequacy of the willingness to pay distribution, we consider two primary statistics: PrðwrepZ400jyÞ and
Prðwrepr60jyÞ: The motivation for this focus is to determine if our model can adequately recover these ‘‘tail’’ probabilities,
while recognizing that our model is not constructed to necessarily recover these quantities.
22 In practice, it is often difﬁcult for
a model to predict such ‘‘extreme’’ outcomes, making statistics such as these a useful metric for assessing the performance of
our model. Though the largest bid in our sample is $600 and the smallest is $10, we focus our calculations instead on more
‘‘interior’’ bid points due to small samples sizes and observed non-monotonicity in our sample. Speciﬁcally, just looking at the
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Fig. 1. 2005 percentage ‘‘Yes’’ by bid value for the ﬁve consequentiality groups.
22 A focus on the mean, for example, is a comparison that should typically be avoided, since parameters of the model often capture the mean of the
distribution of interest. The above quantities clearly rely on the accuracy of the normality assumption.
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raw data, we ﬁnd that 34.6, 28.4 and 34.5 percent of our sample say they are willing to pay bid amounts of $400, $500 and
$600, respectively, for the proposed water quality improvement. This non-monotonicity represents a daunting challenge for
replication purposes, leading us to average these frequencies for all bids greater than or equal to $400 and use this as a basis for
comparison. Performing the required calculations, we ﬁnd a posterior mean (and standard deviation) associated with the event
wrepZ400 equal to 0.35 (0.02), which is close to and within two standard deviations of the fraction in the raw data, 0.32. On
the other end of the WTP distribution, we ﬁnd a posterior mean (and standard deviation) associated with the event wrepr60
equal to 0.44 (0.19), while the observed fraction in the raw data is quite close to this value at 0.39. Taken together, the results of
these calculations do not seem to provide any direct evidence against our model’s assumptions or that any type of re-modeling
beyond what is asserted in (3) and (4) is obviously necessary.
5.2. Parameter estimates and discussion of results
Presented in Table 2 are posterior means and standard deviations associated with the parameters of our model. The
continuous variables age and income are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance for interpretation purposes and
to suitably scale the values of the associated slope parameters. In the willingness to pay equation, we include an intercept
parameter and omit the ci ¼ 2 (‘‘Barely consequential’’) category so that all other elements of dc are interpreted relative to
this excluded group.
The coefﬁcients associated with demographic variables in the willingness to pay equation are generally consistent with
our prior expectations. Females, older respondents, more educated individuals, and those with higher incomes are more
willing to pay for a given water quality improvement. Speciﬁcally, females have a (latent) willingness to pay that is
approximately $73 more than males, on average, while the college educated have a latent WTP approximately $136 higher
than their non-college counterparts. Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in age (approximately 15 years) is
associated with an expected increase in latent willingness to pay of approximately $26, while a similar standard deviation
increase in income (approximately $38,000) is associated with an expected increase in latent willingness pay of about $92.
Perhaps with the exception of the age coefﬁcient (whose posterior probability of being positive is still reasonably high at
0.91), the marginal posteriors associated with these coefﬁcients place nearly all mass over positive values.
As suggested previously in our section on diagnostic checking, few variables emerge as inﬂuential predictors of
consequentiality perceptions, and again, these parameters should not be given any kind of structural interpretation.
Fortunately, our instrument, the indicator denoting the receipt of the highlighted article from the Iowa Conservationist,i s
positively associated with the perceived degree of consequentiality, and the posterior places virtually all mass over positive
values. Simulations from the posterior distribution were also used to show that receipt of the highlighted article increased
the probability that an ‘‘average’’ college educated-female will be in the highest consequentiality groups (i.e., ci 2f 4;5g)b y
about 4.5 percent. Thus our instrument, though not highly inﬂuential, does play some role in explaining variation in
consequentiality perceptions. The only remaining predictor which plays some role in the consequentiality equation is the
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Table 2
Posterior means, standard deviations and probabilities of being positive.
Variable Eð jyÞ Stdð jyÞ Prð 40jyÞ
Consequentiality equation
Constant 1.64 0.059 1.00
Iowa Conservationist Article 0.103 0.046 0.984
Age  0.020 0.025 0.185
Female 0.003 0.051 0.521
College 0.071 0.053 0.914
Income  0.008 0.026 0.397
Willingness to pay equation
Constant 51.34 68.56 0.779
Not consequential  192.1 106.3 0.032
Moderately consequential 34.12 60.39 0.719
Consequential 57.03 98.31 0.720
Deﬁnitely consequential  63.63 150.44 0.331
Age 26.48 19.30 0.909
Female 72.91 39.77 0.974
College 135.99 41.56 0.999
Income 91.79 22.16 1.00
Covariance matrix parameters and cutpoints
s2
u 3:82   10
5 7:46   10
4 1.00
reu 0.099 0.076 0.925
a3 0.785 0.045 1.00
a4 1.89 0.051 1.00
a5 3.07 0.060 1.00
J. Herriges et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 59 (2010) 67–81 77
 11 / 16 
college indicator, with the college educated more likely to believe that the survey is deﬁnitely consequential, and less likely
to believe that it has no impact on policy decisions.
Interestingly, we also ﬁnd evidence suggesting an important role for unobserved confounding in our application.
Speciﬁcally, the posterior mean of the correlation between the errors in (1) and (2), denotedrcw; was found to be 0.099, and
Prðrcw40jyÞ¼0:925: This suggests, with a reasonable degree of posterior certainty, that unobserved characteristics leading
the agent to believe that a survey is likely to be consequential are positively related with unobserved factors contributing to
WTP. Said differently, characteristics of people who believe that their actions (such as responses to a survey) can make a
difference correlate positively with (unobserved) factors making a person willing to pay to see such improvements come to
fruition. Though the magnitude of this correlation is small, the fact that the marginal posterior concentrates on positive
values suggests the need to control for the potential endogeneity of perceived consequentiality.
A more formal investigation regarding the importance of unobserved confounding can be conducted by providing a test










where Mj denotes model j; j ¼ 1;2, pðMjjyÞ denotes the posterior probability of model j, pðyjMjÞ¼
R
Yjpðyjyj;MjÞpðyjjMjÞdyj
is the marginal likelihood associated with model j and pðMjÞ is the prior probability associated with model j. A common
convention is to assume that both models are equally probable a priori so that the prior odds ratio cancels in (14) and thus
the posterior odds ratio K12 equals the ratio of marginal likelihoods (also known as the Bayes factor).
To apply this model comparison method to our particular problem, let M1 denote the restricted model with reu ¼ 0 and
let M2 denote the unrestricted model in (3) and (4). For hypotheses like this one, provided parameters common to M1 and








the ratio of the marginal posterior and prior ordinate at zero under the unrestricted model. Calculating this ratio produces a
posterior odds value equal to 0.35, suggesting that the unrestricted model with reua0 is favored over the restricted version
by a factor of approximately 2.84 to 1. This, again, provides evidence supporting the need to control for unobserved
confounding and the endogeneity of consequentiality perceptions in our application.
5.3. Do the data support a knife-edge effect of consequentiality?
The results of Table 2 clearly indicate that the perceived policy consequentiality of the survey does impact the
individual’s response to the CV referendum, with those believing the survey to be completely inconsequential reporting a
WTP that is signiﬁcantly lower than the baseline group (i.e., ci ¼ 2). A natural question to ask in this setting is whether the
effect is a knife-edge one. That is, are the WTP distributions, and speciﬁc features of those distributions, equal for
individuals with varying, but positive, perceptions regarding the survey’s policy consequentiality? Recall that the
theoretical work of Carson and Groves [2] supports the notion of a knife-edge result when strong consequentiality is
considered. It is less clear whether a similar result will hold in the context of policy consequentiality alone.
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Fig. 2. Willingness to pay posterior predictive distributions for ﬁve consequentiality groups.
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Our ﬁrst step in the investigation of this question is to plot the posterior predictive willingness to pay distributions for
the various consequentiality groups, using the methodology described in Section 3.1 of the paper. These plots are presented
in Fig. 2, and are calculated, for simplicity, for a college-educated female of average age and income who received the article
touting the importance of the survey.
What we take away from Fig. 2 is some evidence that is broadly consistent with the knife-edge result. The implied WTP
distributions for the group believing the survey to be completely inconsequential ðc ¼ 1Þ seems rather different from those
of the other groups, and the remaining densities seem mostly similar. The location of the mass of the densities might also
seem somewhat surprising, as non-negligible mass is placed over seemingly large dollar amounts. In this regard, we
remind the reader of results discussed in our diagnostic checks of Section 5.1: in the raw data, 34.5 percent of individuals
are willing to pay the maximum assigned bid value of $600. As such, the posterior predictives must place considerable mass
to the right of this largest bid point. The problem here is that we do not observe any outcomes to the right of the maximum
bid of $600 to inform the shape of this distribution over that region; instead, its shape is determined by estimating a mean,
a variance and other statistics purely from a sequence of binary responses, which are then used (together with our
parametric assumptions) to characterize the entire WTP predictive. Although one might suspect that these predictives
places too much mass over large WTP values, there is simply no information available from the data to either support or
refute these suspicions.
Importantly, the predictive WTP distributions in the ﬁgure unite two conceptually different sources of information.
First, they account for the direct ‘‘structural’’ impacts of consequentiality perceptions on willingness to pay through the dc
coefﬁcients. Second, they also account for the role of unobservables and the fact that individuals believing the survey to be
very consequential have, on average, unobserved characteristics that also make them more likely to pay for a given
environmental improvement.
As a test of the knife-edge result, what seems to be of primary interest is a comparison of the structural coefﬁcients. If
differences in the WTP distributions for those with cZ2 arise only because of differences in unobservables across groups,
then the ﬁndings of our analysis are still consistent with the knife-edge result. That is, any differences in willingness to pay
can be interpreted as arising only from the observational nature of the survey itself, since, in the survey area, we are not
able to randomly assign individuals to groups where all factors will be, on average, balanced across the groups. Conversely,
if the structural parameters are signiﬁcantly different, this suggests persistent WTP differences that cannot be explained
through differences in unobservables, and could potentially be argued to be at odds with a knife-edge hypothesis.
To compare these structural coefﬁcients more formally, we report a variety of quantities of interest in Table 3. For the
ﬁrst set of entries of the table, we calculate posterior probabilities of the form Prðdcj4dckjyÞ8 j;k 2f 1;...;5g.
23 These
parameters, and the corresponding probabilities mentioned above, are what researchers might typically look to ﬁrst as a
‘‘test’’ of the theory. As is evident from the table, the subgroup who perceives the survey as being completely irrelevant for
policy purposes clearly has lower willingness to pay than those who believe the survey to be somewhat consequential, and
also a lower (though this statement is made with far less certainty) WTP than those regarding the survey as completely
consequential. This result is consistent with the CG theoretical predictions, wherein the behavior of individuals believing
that the survey is irrelevant cannot be characterized; our results suggest that these individuals have different WTP reports
than the remaining groups, supporting the notion that these agents and their reports can be excluded in practice.
There is also reasonably strong evidence that, among those believing the survey to be at least minimally consequential,
the structural impacts across groups are not obviously distinguishable. This is evident from the fact, apart from the
comparison between groups 4 and 5, most of the probabilities found in the table do not seem to provide strong evidence of
parameter differences.
To investigate this issue more formally, we revisit Eq. (14) and calculate Bayes factors associated with the individual
restrictions dcj ¼ 0, for j 2f 1;3;4;5g: We would regard our analysis as providing support for the theoretical predictions if
the Bayes factor associated with dc1 favored keeping the indicator in the model, while those associated with dc3, dc4 and dc5
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Table 3
Posterior probabilities and posterior predictive WTP statistics across different levels of consequentiality.
Variable Consequentiality response
12345
Prðdc14  j yÞ –––––
Prðdc24  j yÞ 0.97 – – – –
Prðdc34  j yÞ 0.96 0.44 – – –
Prðdc44  j yÞ 0.94 0.51 0.64 – –
Prðdc54  j yÞ 0.73 0.29 0.20 0.08 –
Median WTP 0 $171.06 $264.9 $355.0 $306.2
Mean WTP $218.44 $349.42 $404.67 $468.12 $434.22
23 For example, the table can be used to show that Prðdc24dc1jyÞ¼0:97; and similarly for the remaining entries.
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favored excluding the indicators from the model. When performing these calculations, we ﬁnd Bayes factors in favor of the
zero restriction equal to 0.36, 2.93,1.74 and 1.20 for j ¼ 1;3;4;5, respectively. Thus, by a factor of approximately 2.8 to 1, we
support keeping the indicator for the inconsequential group in the model, and also support (to varying degrees), dropping
the remaining consequentiality indicators.
24 Again, these results provide support for the knife-edge theoretical predictions;
similar WTP distributions emerge for those believing the survey to be minimally consequential, while those believing the
survey to be completely inconsequential have different WTP distributions, even after accounting for unobserved
differences across the groups.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of policy consequentiality in context of dichotomous choice CV referenda.
Speciﬁcally, we have tested the hypothesis of whether willingness to pay distributions are equal for those individuals who
believe the survey has at least some potential for shaping policy decisions. Using a treatment-response model that controls
for unobserved confounding and exploits a survey design in which a subsample of individuals are randomly provided
supporting material documenting the importance of the study, we ﬁnd evidence that is broadly consistent with a knife-
edge impact for policy consequentiality. That is, we ﬁnd support for the equality of WTP distributions among those
believing the survey is at least minimally consequential, while those believing the survey will have no effect on policy have
statistically different distributions associated with WTP.
25 Our methodology also makes use of a new Bayesian posterior
simulator for ﬁtting the nonlinear treatment-response model, which we hope will appeal to other researchers seeking to
estimate models with a similar structure.
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